

# SPOTLIGHT ON CONGRESS

## Otepka vs. Rostow

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A brief just filed before a State Department hearing officer for Otto Otepka reveals that this career State Department security officer first ran into trouble in 1960 when he expressed reservations about a proposed clearance for Walt Whitman Rostow. Twice before, under the Eisenhower Administration, Rostow had been denied a State Department clearance to handle sensitive data, and Otepka indicated to Dean Rusk and Attorney General-designate Robert Kennedy that he would probably still evaluate Rostow's file in the same manner.

This episode had a decidedly different effect on the careers of the two principals involved. Rostow was given immediate clearance as a White House aide, where the only security criterion is the President's say-so; he moved under this clearance to the State Department Policy Planning Council, and is now, ironically, special assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Otepka became the victim of a scheme which involved perjury, wire tapping and character assassination, in an effort to remove him from his important post. Security procedures spelled out in law and regulation virtually collapsed, as "emergency clearances" and high-level say-so approvals superseded objective review. In the brief filed before the hearing examiner, Otepka is fighting not only to get his job back, but also to keep American defense secrets from the enemy.

There are those today who hold that the concept of security clearances is out of date. The necessity for rigidly adhering to security procedures should be obvious, in view of the continuing efforts by the Soviet Union to undermine the free world, and particularly in view of recent disclosures.

Even as Otto Otepka's case comes to a head, British newspapers have been filled with accounts of the damage suffered by both Britain and the United States from the work of just three British traitors. Facts never made public before show that the Soviet Union had more access to our secrets in both World War II and the Korean War than previously realized.

It is now revealed that the Soviet master spy, Harold Philby, easily infiltrated the highest levels of British intelligence before he defected to the Soviet Union. A life-long dedicated Communist, Philby posed as a British patriot to become the head of the Soviet bureau of the British intelligence office. In reality, Philby was spying for the Soviet Union. Later he became the trusted liaison between British intelligence and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency—thus putting himself in a position to give the Communists knowledge about all the general operations of both major Western intelligence operations.

Philby's role was not revealed even when he tipped off Guy Burgess and Donald MacLean, enabling them to flee to the Soviet Union. Later on he voluntarily left Britain and went to the Soviet Union himself. Although officials here and abroad had passed off MacLean's work as non-sensitive, the British newspapers now reveal that a secret 1956 State Department report made it clear

that MacLean was the primary channel for Soviet espionage during the Korean War.

MacLean was first secretary in the British Embassy in Washington, and later head of the American Department of the Foreign Office in London. MacLean had full knowledge of the fateful American decision to confine the fighting to Korea itself, and to permit Red sanctuaries above the Yalu River. Gen. MacArthur complained bitterly that this hobbling decision, and all his strategic troop movements, were known immediately by the enemy.

Lax security by the British thus was one important factor that led to the indecisive stalemate in Korea. Moreover, our failure to win the war in Korea is the chief reason why we are being forced to fight the Communists again in Viet Nam.

The British experience illustrates that strict security practices must be kept up continuously. It is not necessary to assume that a person denied a security clearance is disloyal. As long as human beings handle sensitive secrets, the element of risk is always a factor. Nevertheless, that risk increases in direct proportion as known elements of risk are ignored.

The granting of a security clearance to anyone without a full field investigation is contrary to sound and accepted practices and is a conscious flouting of the nation's security. Otto Otepka has laid his entire career on the block in a courageous effort to make America understand this danger.